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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs alleging legal malpractice in some states must file 
expert affidavits1 supporting their claims before trial.2 
Requirements for these affidavits vary by state; in Minnesota, for 
example, they must contain specific details linking the defendant’s 
negligent conduct to the plaintiff’s damages.3 This imposes a high 
burden on plaintiffs and filters out frivolous lawsuits that will never 
obtain legitimate expert support.4 This burden, however, is a 
double-edged sword: it can also preclude meritorious claims that, 
for some reason, cannot timely secure adequate expert support.5 
Minnesota Statutes section 544.42 requires plaintiffs to file two 
pretrial expert affidavits supporting legal and other non-medical 
malpractice claims.6 Section 544.42 also allows for additional time 
to remedy defects in the second, more detailed and burdensome of 
the two affidavit requirements,7 which helps prevent dismissals of 
meritorious claims. In Guzick v. Kimball, the Minnesota Supreme 
1.  Expert affidavits may sometimes be called “certificates of merit.” See
Certificate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
2.  See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§ 37:62 (2016 ed.) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602 (West, Westlaw through
2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 52d Leg.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 70th Gen. Assemb.); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 9-11-9.1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 668.11 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 544.42 
(2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Leg.); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 19.1 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 
55th Leg.); PA.R.C.P. No. 1042.3 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2016)).  
3.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 4(a) (requiring details on “issues of
negligence, malpractice, or causation” and “a summary of the grounds for each 
opinion”). 
4.  See, e.g., Parker v. O’Phelan, 414 N.W.2d 534, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987),
aff’d, 428 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1988) (noting the purpose of a medical affidavit 
requirement is to eliminate “nuisance malpractice suits”). 
5.  See Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn.
1990) (noting that an abrupt dismissal for failure to file an affidavit could 
terminate a “meritorious cause of action”). 
6.  MINN. STAT. § 544.42.
7.  Id. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c).
2
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Court established that a legal malpractice plaintiff can obtain 
additional time only if her affidavit passes a two-step process.8 First, 
provided a set of facts, courts determine on a case-by-case basis 
which elements of legal malpractice require expert support.9 If a lay 
juror would likely not understand how the facts of the case relate to 
an element of malpractice, expert support is required for that 
element.10 Second, courts evaluate the expert support for each 
required element, and if the support is deficient, the court may 
dismiss the case before trial without granting the plaintiff any time 
to remedy the deficiency.11 
Guzick was the supreme court’s first legal malpractice case 
interpreting section 544.42. Arguably, its primary contribution to 
Minnesota jurisprudence was interpreting the first of the two steps: 
determining which elements of legal malpractice require expert 
support. Guzick upheld the second step—the court’s ability to 
evaluate expert support—from the court’s previous case on section 
544.42.12
Guzick’s two-step process is problematic because it opens the 
door to two ways plaintiffs can lose their cases. First, a plaintiff 
might fail to anticipate that the court may require expert support 
for an element of malpractice after applying its lay juror standard. 
This would make the affidavit insufficient. Second, even if the 
plaintiff correctly identifies all the elements that require expert 
support, she still may not solicit enough detail from the expert. 
Again, this would be insufficient. Guzick, therefore, sets two traps 
for plaintiffs to lose a case with prejudice on a procedural misstep. 
This threatens the law’s “primary objective . . . to dispose of cases 
on the merits.”13 This is what is at stake after Guzick. 
8.  See Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 49 (Minn. 2015) (noting that “[i]f
expert disclosure is required for a particular element [of malpractice],” the court 
must then determine if the disclosure for that element is satisfactory). The Guzick 
court held that the plaintiff’s affidavit did not pass this process. Id. at 51. 
9.  See id. at 48–49.
10.  Id. at 49 (citing Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 337, 252 N.W.2d
107, 116 (1977)). 
11.  See id. at 51–52; see also Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732
N.W.2d 209, 217–19 (Minn. 2007). 
12. The previous Minnesota Supreme Court case on section 544.42 was an
accounting malpractice case. See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d 209. 
13. Firoved v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 Minn. 278, 283, 152 N.W.2d 364, 368
(1967). 
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This Note begins with a history of legal malpractice and the 
statutory framework underlying Guzick.14 The facts, procedural 
history, and majority analysis of Guzick follow.15 The analysis of this 
Note argues that courts should not dismiss cases on the basis of a 
defective affidavit without providing time to remedy defects.16 The 
court’s unforgiving approach contradicts legislative intent to avoid 
dismissing meritorious lawsuits and needlessly goes beyond the 
plain language of section 544.42.17 The court’s self-imposed ability 
to grant extra time on an evaluative basis18 also opens the door for 
inconsistent and unpredictable application. This, in turn, may 
result in public distrust in the legal profession. On a plain reading 
of the statute, extra time is automatically granted to remedy a 
defect.19 Consequently, when the court has the opportunity, it 
should overrule Guzick and adopt a plain reading of the statute.20 
II. HISTORY
This section explains the history of a narrow area of 
malpractice law: Minnesota’s requirement for expert affidavits 
certifying medical and non-medical malpractice claims. To 
understand these certification requirements, this section begins 
with a brief historical overview of legal malpractice in Minnesota. 
This discussion then shifts to a period of radical change in 
Minnesota medical malpractice law: the years before and after the 
1986 Tort Reform Act became effective. As one of its many new 
provisions, the Tort Reform Act created a statutory requirement for 
expert affidavits in medical malpractice lawsuits.21 In 1997, this 
requirement was extended to non-medical professional 
14.  See infra Part II.
15.  See infra Part III.
16.  See infra Part IV; see also Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 55 (Lillehaug, J.,
concurring) (arguing that not providing additional time for plaintiffs to remedy 
affidavit defects might “damage [] our bedrock principle of statutory 
interpretation” and cause “the premature death of potentially meritorious 
claims”). 
17.  Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 52–56.
18.  See id. at 53 (noting that the “concepts of ‘major’ and ‘minor’
deficiencies [] are judicial concoctions”). 
19.  See id. at 55 (citing Wesely v. Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 2011)).
20.  See id.
21. Tort Reform Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 455, § 60, 1986 Minn. Laws 840,
871–72 (creating section 145.682, a new statute for expert certification in medical 
malpractice). 
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malpractice, including legal malpractice, in a separate but very 
similar statute.22 Finally, this section provides an in-depth look at 
how Minnesota courts have applied and interpreted these statutory 
requirements for expert affidavits. 
A. A General History of Legal Malpractice 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has long held that if an 
attorney’s negligence harms a client, the attorney is responsible for 
the damages.23 The court recognized early on that it is not always 
clear when an attorney-client relationship exists.24 But when there is 
an attorney-client relationship, the court has articulated that the 
scope of a lawyer’s duty to her client is to act “in good faith to the 
best of [her] skill and knowledge . . . .”25 An attorney abiding by this 
standard does not breach her duty because of a simple error or 
mistake.26 
Putting much of this common law into a modern framework, 
the court adopted four elements that are now required for a prima 
facie legal malpractice claim: (1) an attorney-client relationship, 
(2) a negligent act, (3) proximate causation, and (4) but-for 
causation.27 Soon after the court established these elements, it also 
established a general rule that a negligent act—the duty and 
breach components—must be supported by expert testimony.28 
The court took this standard directly from its medical malpractice 
jurisprudence.29 If these elements were not supported by proper 
22.  Act of May 30, 1997, ch. 212, § 2, 1997 Minn. Laws 1917, 1917–20
(creating section 544.42, a new statute for expert certification in non-medical 
malpractice).  
23.  See, e.g., Schoregge v. Bishop, 29 Minn. 367, 371, 13 N.W. 194, 196 (1882)
(“The attorney is answerable to his clients in damages for any abuse of his trust, or 
the consequences of his ignorance, negligence, or indiscretion . . . .”). 
24.  See Ryan v. Long, 35 Minn. 394, 394, 29 N.W. 51, 51 (1886) (holding that
an attorney-client relationship existed when an attorney provided solicited legal 
advice); see also Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692 
(Minn. 1980) (recognizing Ryan as the first Minnesota case to question whether an 
attorney-client relationship existed).  
25.  Sjobeck v. Leach, 213 Minn. 360, 365, 6 N.W.2d 819, 822 (1942) (quoting
5 AM. JUR. Attorneys at Law § 125 (1936)). 
26.  Id.
27.  Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 692 (citing Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144,
150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293–94 (1970)). 
28. Hill v. Okay Const. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 337, 252 N.W.2d 107, 116 (1977).
29.  Id.
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expert testimony at trial, the consequence was typically a directed 
verdict in favor of the defendant.30 Notably, the court made an 
exception for the requirement of expert testimony when the 
lawyer’s duty and breach of that duty “are within the area of 
common knowledge and lay comprehension.”31 
Today, the standards for expert testimony are much stricter. 
Section 544.42 requires that a properly-identified expert supports a 
legal malpractice claim well before trial even begins.32 As the 
discussion below explores, medical malpractice law influenced the 
development of these stricter procedural limitations.33 
B. Minnesota’s Tort Reform Act 
In the 1970s and 1980s, medical malpractice lawsuits across the 
nation were becoming more frequent34 and jury awards were 
getting larger.35 In turn, insurers raised their rates, and 
consequently, some medical services became more expensive.36 
This became a nationwide problem, and many states initiated tort 
reform to reduce the number of lawsuits and the size of damage 
awards.37 
30.  See Lhotka v. Larson, 307 Minn. 121, 130, 238 N.W.2d 870, 876 (1976);
Silver v. Redleaf, 292 Minn. 463, 463, 194 N.W.2d 271, 271 (1972); Swanson v. 
Chatterton, 281 Minn. 129, 130–31, 160 N.W.2d 662, 664 (1968). 
31.  Hill, 312 Minn. at 336–37, 252 N.W.2d at 116.
32.  See MINN. STAT. § 544.42 (2016).
33.  See House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (D. Minn. 2000) (stating
that the Minnesota legislature used a medical malpractice statute “as a blueprint” 
for a statute relating to legal malpractice). 
34. For example, a national insurer, The St. Paul Companies, Inc. (now
merged with Travelers insurance), reported 3113 physician malpractice claims in 
1979; in 1983, the company reported 5870 claims—an eighty-eight percent 
increase. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., OFF. OF THE LEGIS. AUDITOR, ST. OF MINN.,
PUB. NO. 86-0333, INSURANCE REGULATION 81 (1986), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/pre2003/other/860333.pdf. 
35. In 1980, the average jury award was $404,726; just four years later in
1984, it had more than doubled to $954,858. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and 
Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 L. CONTEMP. PROB. 57, 57–58 
(1986) (citing JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., INJURY VALUATION REPORTS, No. 292, 
CURRENT AWARD TRENDS 18–19 (1985)). 
36.  Shirley Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 417, 418–19 (1986). 
37.  PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., supra note 34, at 94 (“Many states have tried to
[reduce the frequency and size of damage awards] by enacting changes in the tort 
liability system.”). 
6
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/7
 
2017] GUZICK V. KIMBALL 271 
In January 1986, a division of the Legislative Audit 
Commission released a report about insurance regulation in 
Minnesota, which noted a “rapid increase in rates” for some 
commercial liability insurance, including medical malpractice.38 It 
further noted that national trends in jury awards “made certain 
lines of insurance appear very risky to insurance companies.”39 The 
report also pointed towards evidence that tort reforms in other 
states helped contain insurance claims.40 
In March 1986, the Minnesota legislature approved the Tort 
Reform Act.41 A Senate session report stated that the Tort Reform 
Act “provide[d] a long-term approach to reducing insurance costs 
by providing tort reform directed at decreasing the cost of civil 
lawsuits, which [was] increasing at the rate of 10 to 15 percent per 
year.”42 The report also stated one of the act’s goals was 
“eliminating frivolous civil lawsuits.”43 
Part of the Tort Reform Act required affidavits from experts to 
support a claim for malpractice.44 This requirement made it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to proceed with lawsuits.45 This, in turn, 
helped prevent frivolous lawsuits.46 The next section considers 
these affidavit requirements in detail. 
C. Affidavits for Medical Malpractice: Section 145.682 
Section 145.682 was drafted as part of the Tort Reform Act, in 
part to reduce frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits.47 The statute 
38.  Id. at xii.
39.  Id.
40.  Id. at xiii.
41. Tort Reform Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 455, § 60, 1986 Minn. Laws 840,
886. 
42. Karen L. Clark et al., Bill Highlights, 12 SESSION REV., no. 2, 1986, at 1, 11,
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/pre2003/other/861076.pdf (discussing the 
“Omnibus insurance bill”).  
43.  Id.
44.  § 60, 1986 Minn. Laws at 871–72.  
45. In its report, the Program Evaluation Division mentioned that “several
states have changed evidentiary and procedural aspects of trials” in order to 
“impose greater burdens on the plaintiffs of a personal injury case.” PROGRAM 
EVALUATION DIV., supra note 34, at 97. 
46.  See Parker v. O’Phelan, 414 N.W.2d 534, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that the primary purpose of section 145.682 was to “eliminate nuisance 
malpractice suits”), aff’d, 428 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1988). 
47.  Id.; see generally E. Curtis Roeder, Note, Introduction to Minnesota’s Tort
7
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currently requires two affidavits of expert opinion in support of the 
malpractice claim.48 The first affidavit, the affidavit of expert review, 
is usually filed with the plaintiff’s complaint.49 The affidavit of 
expert review must only disclose that an expert read the facts, 
concluded that the defendant breached a duty she owed to the 
plaintiff, and concluded that the defendant’s breach caused 
damages.50 The expert is qualified if it is reasonable to expect that 
her testimony would be admitted at trial.51 Second, an affidavit of 
expert disclosure must be served within 180 days of the 
commencement of discovery.52 The second affidavit, the affidavit of 
expert disclosure, must identify the expert and provide the 
substance and grounds of the opinion.53 In place of a formal 
affidavit of expert disclosure, answering an interrogatory can also 
satisfy the statute.54 If a plaintiff does not meet these requirements, 
the defendant can submit a motion to dismiss the case.55 
In 2001, in response to meritorious lawsuits being dismissed 
over minor technical errors,56 a bill was introduced to create a safe 
harbor period for remedying defective affidavits of expert 
disclosure.57 The House sponsor of the bill specifically said that he 
wanted to protect plaintiffs from a civil procedure that was “too 
strict.”58 He added that “there [was] a developing practice among 
Reform Act, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 277, 303–06 (1987). 
48.  MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 2 (2016).
49.  Id.
50.  Id. § 145.682, subdiv. 3(a).
51.  Id. As an example, a general pediatrician with no specialization in
pediatric oncology was not qualified to provide an affidavit regarding a bone 
marrow transplant. Teffeteller v. Univ. of Minn., 645 N.W.2d 420, 427–28 (Minn. 
2002). 
52.  MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 2.
53.  Id. § 145.682, subdiv. 4(a).
54.  Id.
55.  Id. § 145.682, subdiv. 6(a).
56.  Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 217 (Minn.
2007) (citing Minn. S., S. Deb. on S.F. 0936, 82d Minn. Leg., Reg. Sess. (May 16, 
2001) (audio tape) (statement of Sen. Neuville)). Before the enactment of the 
safe harbor provision, it was well established that section 145.682 could have harsh 
outcomes. See generally Jason Leo, Comment, Torts—Medical Malpractice: The 
Legislature’s Attempt to Prevent Cases without Merit Denies Valid Claims, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1399, 1419–22 (2000). 
57. H.F. 1051, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (Minn. 2001).
58.  MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: PUB. INFO. OFF., NEW LAWS 2001: A 
COMPLETE SUMMARY OF THE REGULAR LEGISLATIVE SESSION AND SPECIAL SESSION 88 
8
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medical malpractice defense attorneys to move to dismiss otherwise 
legitimate complaints” because of minor technical errors.59 
Although Governor Jesse Ventura vetoed the bill because of an 
issue unrelated to safe harbor in 2001,60 he signed another bill 
containing the safe harbor provision in 200261 that became effective 
on May 22, 2002.62 Section 145.682 now contains a safe harbor 
provision that provides plaintiffs at least forty-five days to correct 
errors upon service of a motion to dismiss.63 
D. Affidavits for Legal and Other Non-Medical Malpractice: Section 
544.42 
In 1997, the legislature enacted section 544.42 to expand the 
scope of the principles in section 145.682 to include non-medical 
professionals.64 Not surprisingly, the language, content, and timing 
requirements of section 544.42 closely track section 145.682.65 The 
two-affidavit requirement is virtually identical.66 First, the affidavit 
of expert review, which is typically served with the complaint, only 
needs to verify that a qualified expert reviewed the facts of the case 
(2001), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2008/other/080895.pdf. 
59.  Id.
60.  See id.
61.  See Act of May 22, 2002, ch. 403, § 1, 2002 Minn. Laws 1706, 1706–07
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 6 (2002)). 
62.  Id. at 1712.
63.  See MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 6(c)(2) (2016) (“[T]he time for
hearing the motion is at least 45 days from the date of service of the motion.”).  
64.  See House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (D. Minn. 2000); see also
MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 1(1) (defining “professionals” as attorneys, 
architects, accountants, engineers, land surveyors, and landscape architects). The 
hearing on the bill that created section 544.42 demonstrated that section 544.42’s 
purpose was to avoid frivolous lawsuits, just as it was for section 145.682: during 
the hearing, Senator Ranum, an author of the bill, stated that “if we begin to do 
what we’ve done in the medical malpractice area  . . . people will look for . . . 
experts early and evaluate their cases earlier, and I believe that if there are 
frivolous lawsuits that . . . really aren’t meritorious, you will screen them out in this 
process.” Hearing on S.F. 627 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 80th Minn. Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Mar. 25, 1997) (on file with Mitchell Hamline Law Review).  
65.  See Meyer v. Dygert, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (D. Minn. 2001) (“[T]he
statutory language for both statutes is, in major substance, the same.”); House, 105 
F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (discussing that the two statutes have “nearly identical” 
content). 
66.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 2, with id. § 544.42, subdiv. 2.
9
Jardine: Torts: No Statutory Interpretation Required—Guzick v. Kimball
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
 
274 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
and found probable negligence.67 Then, the affidavit of expert 
disclosure, which outlines the expert’s reasoning, must be served 
within 180 days of the commencement of discovery.68 An answer to 
an interrogatory can serve as an affidavit of expert disclosure.69 If a 
plaintiff fails to meet these requirements, the defendant can move 
to dismiss the case.70 
The state legislature enacted section 544.42 with a safe harbor 
provision similar to section 145.682’s, which can provide the 
plaintiff sixty days to remedy any deficiencies in the second affidavit 
upon service of a motion to dismiss.71 However, unlike section 
145.682, the defendant’s motion to dismiss does not trigger safe 
harbor under section 544.42; the court triggers safe harbor by 
providing the plaintiff with notice of the affidavit’s deficiencies.72 
The purpose of the new statute was partly to avoid problems 
associated with the application of section 145.682, which did not 
have a safe harbor provision at the time.73 
E. Minnesota Case Law Interpreting the Statutes 
Minnesota courts have decided cases interpreting these 
statutes with two goals in mind: avoiding frivolous lawsuits74 and 
protecting meritorious lawsuits.75 Long before these statutes were 
67.  Id. § 544.42, subdiv. 3(a)(1).
68.  Id. § 544.42, subdiv. 4(a).
69.  Id.
70.  Id. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(a).
71.  See id. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c).
72.  Compare id. § 145.682, subdiv. 6(c)(2) (“[T]he time for hearing the
motion is at least 45 days from the date of service of the motion.”), with id. 
§ 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (“[A]fter notice by the court, the nonmoving party is given
60 days to satisfy the disclosure requirements.”). 
73.  See House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (D. Minn. 2000). During
the Senate Committee Hearing on the bill for section 544.42, one speaker noted 
that section 145.682 should also be amended to allow some leeway for plaintiffs 
because motions were routinely challenging cases on the basis of inadequate 
expert qualifications. See Hearing on S.F. 627, supra note 64 (statement of Mr. 
Carlson). Section 544.42’s safe harbor provision took care of this problem, but at 
the time, section 145.682 did not provide this option. See Broehm v. Mayo Clinic 
Rochester, 690 N.W.2d 721, 725 n.1 (Minn. 2005) (noting that the legislature 
added the safe-harbor provision to section 145.682 in 2002). 
74.  See, e.g., Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572, 578 (Minn.
1999) (“It is the legislative choice to implement the policy of eliminating frivolous 
medical malpractice lawsuits by dismissal.”). 
75.  See, e.g., Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193
10
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enacted, the court was concerned about dismissing meritorious 
cases on procedural grounds.76 The two goals regarding frivolous 
and meritorious cases also reflect the goals of the legislature: the 
initial purpose of the medical malpractice statute was to make it 
harder to file frivolous lawsuits,77 but the legislature showed that it 
was also concerned about dismissing meritorious cases when it 
provided safe harbor provisions for sections 145.682 and 544.42.78 
The court has struggled to strike a balance between the two goals 
because they present a dichotomy: allowing too many malpractice 
suits to go to trial will allow many frivolous lawsuits to proceed, and 
trying to stamp out every potentially frivolous case will preclude 
meritorious cases.79 
Two recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases demonstrate that 
this struggle has continued. In 2007, the court considered Brown-
Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co.,80 its first non-medical 
malpractice case involving a deficient affidavit under section 
544.42.81 Brown-Wilbert required that plaintiffs’ affidavits strictly 
(Minn. 1990) (“[T]he sanction imposed by section 145.682 is the abrupt 
termination with prejudice of what may be a meritorious cause of action.”). 
76. Firoved v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 Minn. 278, 283, 152 N.W.2d 364, 368
(1967) (“An order of dismissal on procedural grounds runs counter to the primary 
objective of the law to dispose of cases on the merits. Since a dismissal with 
prejudice operates as an adjudication on the merits, it is the most punitive 
sanction which can be imposed for noncompliance with the rules or order of the 
court or for failure to prosecute.”). 
77. Clark et al., supra note 42 (“The tort reform provided by Chapter 455 is
aimed at eliminating frivolous civil lawsuits . . . .”). 
78.  See MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 58.
79. A case from before the medical malpractice statute was enacted sums up
the dichotomy nicely: “Physicians should not be plagued with defending 
unmeritorious lawsuits, but a wronged patient is entitled to pursue a warranted 
claim.” Anderson v. Florence, 288 Minn. 351, 359, 181 N.W.2d 873, 878 (1970). 
80. 732 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 2007).
81. Although the Supreme Court of Minnesota did not address what to do
with a deficient affidavit before Brown-Wilbert, lower Minnesota courts and federal 
courts denied safe harbor in at least three cases because the plaintiff completely 
failed to file the second affidavit under section 544.42. See Meyer v. Dygert, 156 F. 
Supp. 2d 1081, 1091 (D. Minn. 2001) (citing House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 
1045, 1054 (D. Minn. 2000) (noting that safe harbor only applies “where the 
plaintiff has filed a deficient affidavit”)); House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (stating 
that the sixty days of safe harbor serve to “avoid[] harsh consequences arising from 
inadvertent drafting errors . . . and is available only when . . . filed within 180 
days”); Middle River-Snake River Watershed Dist. v. Dennis Drewes, Inc., 692 
N.W.2d 87, 91 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the court has to issue specific 
11
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meet detailed substantive requirements to use safe harbor and did 
not provide an exception for affidavits filed in good faith.82 In 2011, 
Wesely v. Flor83 considered the court’s first medical malpractice case 
that analyzed section 145.682 after the legislature added the safe 
harbor provision to the statute in 2002.84 Wesely determined that 
virtually all plaintiffs that timely submit an affidavit should be 
granted safe harbor—likely even those that do not file in good 
faith.85 Despite sections 145.682 and 544.42 both containing safe 
harbor provisions, the two holdings end up on opposite ends of the 
meritorious/frivolous dichotomy. To understand this discrepancy, 
this subsection shows how the medical malpractice case law has 
shifted from a concern for protecting meritorious cases to 
preventing frivolous cases. The non-medical malpractice case law 
then followed suit. Finally, after the addition of the safe harbor 
provision to section 145.682, the medical malpractice case law 
moved back towards a greater concern for meritorious cases, but 
the non-medical malpractice case law did not. 
1. A Second Chance for Meritorious Cases: Sorenson v. St. Paul
Ramsey Medical Center
The Minnesota Supreme Court was initially very concerned 
about dismissing meritorious lawsuits in the years before and after 
section 145.682 was enacted.86 The court avoided a rigid 
deficiencies in the affidavit if it grants safe harbor, and there can be no 
deficiencies in a non-existent affidavit). 
82.  Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 216 (“[W]e read section 544.42, subdivision
4, to describe objective requirements for an affidavit of expert disclosure that can 
be measured on the face of any document that is claimed to be such an affidavit, 
without inquiry into counsel’s intent.”). 
83. 806 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2011).
84.  Id. at 40 (“This is our first opportunity to interpret the safe-harbor
provision of section 145.682.”). 
85.  See id. at 41–42 (“Here, under section 145.682, the safe-harbor period is
an automatic, 45-day delay before the court hears any arguments or makes any 
decisions regarding deficiencies in the affidavit.”). 
86.  See, e.g., Dennie v. Metro. Med. Ctr., 387 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Minn. 1986).
Dennie was a medical malpractice case decided just before the enactment of 
section 145.682. Quoting an older case, Dennie noted that “[a]n order of dismissal 
on procedural grounds runs counter to the primary objective of the law to dispose 
of cases on the merits.” Id. (quoting Firoved v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 Minn. 278, 
283, 152 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1967)). 
12
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application of the statute that might dismiss meritorious cases.87 
This meant that when a plaintiff filed a potentially deficient 
affidavit, or even no affidavit at all, the court would err on the side 
of avoiding dismissal.88 Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center was 
a major case in this trend.89 
In Sorenson, a woman sued a hospital and two doctors for 
medical malpractice over the stillbirth of her child.90 Her counsel 
properly filed the first affidavit and timely filed the second 
affidavit.91 The defendants were not satisfied with the second 
affidavit, so they moved to compel the plaintiff to answer 
interrogatories and filed interrogatories requesting the substance 
of the expert’s testimony.92 The plaintiff timely answered the 
interrogatories, and the defendants then withdrew their motion to 
compel answers.93 Defendants then “wait[ed] out the 180 days” and 
moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff did not 
meet the affidavit requirements.94 
The Sorenson court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s 
interrogatory answers were defective and could not serve as a 
second affidavit.95 The court reasoned that the answers simply 
87. For example, see Sorenson’s discussion of “borderline cases.” Sorenson v.
St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn. 1990). 
88.  Where no affidavit is filed at all, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
allowed additional time on the basis of excusable neglect. For example, in Stern, a 
plaintiff sued her dentist for medical malpractice and failed to file a second 
affidavit before the 180-day deadline. Stern v. Dill, 442 N.W.2d 322, 323 (Minn. 
1989). The plaintiff requested her dental records from the defendant, but he did 
not release the records for about three months. Id. This reduced the amount of 
time the plaintiff’s expert had to determine a causal relationship for the alleged 
negligence; partly on this basis, the court granted the plaintiff an extension for 
excusable neglect. Id. at 325. Although section 145.682 did not allow for this 
extension, Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02 provides the court discretionary 
power to hear motions after a statute’s timing requirement expires if there is 
excusable neglect. Id. at 324 (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 6.02). And the rules supersede 
a statute when a statute conflicts with a procedural rule relating to “pleading, 
practice, [or] procedure.” Id. (quoting MINN. R. CIV. P. 81.01(c)). Since the court 
found that section 145.482 was procedural in nature, Rule 6.02 superseded it to 
provide an extension. Id. 
89.  See 457 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1990).
90.  Id. at 189.
91.  Id. at 189–90.
92.  Id. at 190.
93.  Id.
94.  Id.
95.  Id. at 192.
13
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contained empty conclusions, such as that the defendant “failed to 
properly evaluate” and “failed to properly diagnose.” The court 
held that there was malpractice without a causal connection.96 
Nevertheless, the court did not dismiss the lawsuit.97 The court 
noted that the defendants removed their motion to compel answers 
after receiving the plaintiff’s answers.98 From the plaintiff’s 
perspective, this signaled that the answers were satisfactory.99 But 
instead, the defendants surprised them by waiting out the 180 days 
and filing a motion to dismiss.100 Because of the defendants’ 
behavior, the court ruled they were “estopped from receiving a 
procedural dismissal.”101 
Sorenson made two significant observations in dicta that 
became perhaps the most influential parts of the case. First, 
Sorenson noted that the plaintiff in the case could have easily 
offered a more detailed affidavit.102 Consequently, Sorenson offered 
a disclosure standard for future cases where the plaintiff had “no 
valid reason” for the defective affidavit.103 After Sorenson, a proper 
disclosure requires a statement on the appropriate standard of 
care, the alleged negligent act, and a causal connection between 
the negligent act and the plaintiff’s damages.104 
Second, Sorenson recognized there are “borderline cases”: cases 
where the plaintiff makes a good faith effort to identify the expert 
and provide “some meaningful disclosure of what the testimony will 
be,” but the disclosure is not substantively adequate.105 Sorenson 
recognized that a mechanical application of the statute could 
dismiss meritorious cases in this category.106 Sorenson, therefore, 
made an opening for the court to consider more than the statute’s 
96.  Id. at 192–93 (quoting language from the plaintiff’s second affidavit).
97.  Id. at 193.
98.  Id.
99.  Id.
 100.  Id. at 190. 
 101.  Id. at 193 (citing Thorson v. Rice Cty. Dist. One Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 410, 
416 (Minn. 1989)).   
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id.; see also House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (D. Minn. 2000) 
(defining borderline cases as “situations in which an affidavit is submitted in good 
faith, but is not deemed substantively sufficient . . . .”). 
 106.  Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193.  
14
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language in its analysis.107 Plaintiffs could avoid dismissal if affidavits 
were filed in good faith—as long as the affidavit did not 
significantly prejudice the defendant.108 In place of outright 
dismissal, Sorenson suggested imposing lesser sanctions, such as 
allowing the defendant to depose the plaintiff’s expert at the 
plaintiff’s expense or restricting testimony to the affidavit’s 
content.109 
Another significant medical malpractice case that followed 
Sorenson is Stroud v. Hennepin County Medical Center.110 Stroud 
dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit, but the decision was arguably 
consistent with Sorenson because the plaintiff had plenty of warning 
to remedy the affidavit.111 
2. No Second Chances: Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc.
At the turn of the century, the court moved away from 
Sorenson’s concern over meritorious lawsuits and more towards a 
concern over frivolous lawsuits, which led to a stricter application 
 107.  House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (“[T]he Court has left an opening in 
which the court can take an alternative action to mandatory dismissal and allow a 
case to proceed on the merits.”). 
 108.  Id. at 1052 (citing Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193). 
 109.  Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193. 
110.  556 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1996). 
 111.  See id. at 556. In Stroud, a woman went to the hospital three times in 
eight days with medical issues. Id. at 553. She was examined and sent home twice. 
Id. The third time she was admitted after suffering a hemorrhage and died just 
over two weeks later in the hospital. Id. Her estate sued, and there were two 
defendants: a hospital and a medical group. Id. A few months into the lawsuit, the 
hospital served interrogatories on the plaintiff requesting a causal explanation for 
the malpractice claim. Id. at 554. The plaintiff answered by simply referring the 
defendant back to the first affidavit in the complaint. Id. The hospital again served 
formal interrogatories and also sent two letters to the plaintiff requesting a causal 
explanation. Id. The 180-day deadline passed without a further submission from 
the plaintiff. Id. Once again, the hospital attempted to elicit interrogatory 
answers—this time with a motion to compel answers—but the plaintiff again 
referred back to the initial affidavit. Id. The plaintiff eventually filed a new 
affidavit, but the hospital joined a motion for summary judgment that the medical 
group had already filed. Id. at 555. The supreme court upheld the district court’s 
original granting of this motion, noting not only that the initial affidavit was 
conclusory under Sorenson but also that the plaintiff’s failure to provide an 
adequate affidavit was “especially troubling” because of the multiple attempts the 
hospital made to obtain a proper affidavit. Id. at 556. 
15
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of the statute.112 Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc.113 started this line of 
cases.114 
In Lindberg, a pregnant patient contacted her health care 
provider three times within roughly twenty-four hours.115 She first 
called about leg swelling and later called with further 
complications.116 She was told to stay home both times.117 The third 
time she called, the provider advised her to go to the hospital.118 
Later that day, her baby was delivered stillborn.119 A medical 
malpractice lawsuit ensued, and the plaintiff timely submitted both 
expert affidavits that section 145.682 requires.120 
The court dismissed the case because the second affidavit 
contained “nothing more than broad and conclusory statements as 
to causation.”121 The affidavit noted that the provider’s “failure to 
instruct Ms. Lindberg to seek prompt medical attention . . . caused 
the death of [Ms. Lindberg’s child].”122 However, this statement did 
not outline a chain of causation tracing the provider’s negligent act 
to the child’s death.123 Following Sorenson’s disclosure standard, the 
Lindberg court noted that a proper affidavit disclosure requires, in 
part, a causal connection between the negligent act and the 
plaintiff’s damages.124 Because this was missing, the court dismissed 
the case.125 In reaching this decision, Lindberg explicitly stated that 
there is no exception to excuse an affidavit that “fall[s] short” of 
the substantive requirement for statements on causation.126 This 
contrasts with Sorenson’s approach to borderline cases, which 
considers the plaintiff’s good faith.127 
 112.  See Leo, supra note 56, at 1400–01 (noting that Lindberg set the trend for 
dismissal of meritorious claims over technicalities in affidavits). 
113.  599 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 1999). 
 114.  See Leo, supra note 56, at 1400–01. 
 115.  See Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 573–74. 
 116.  Id. 
117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 574. 
 119.  Id. 
120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 577–78. 
 122.  Id. at 577. 
 123.  Id. at 578. 
 124.  Id. at 577 (citing Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 
193 (Minn. 1990)). 
 125.  Id. at 579. 
 126.  Id. at 578. 
 127.  See House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1052–53 (D. Minn. 2000) 
16
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In reaching its decision, the Lindberg court steered away from 
Sorenson’s concern for meritorious cases and focused narrowly on 
the legislature’s intent to eliminate frivolous cases: 
Dismissal is mandated under [section 145.682] when the 
disclosure requirements are not met and while we 
certainly recognize that the statute may have harsh results 
in some cases, it cuts with a sharp but clean edge. It is the 
legislative choice to implement the policy of eliminating frivolous 
medical malpractice lawsuits by dismissal.128 
Thus, the court directly connected the dismissal to the legislature’s 
goal of eliminating frivolous cases. 
The Lindberg decision was in stark contrast with Sorenson. 
Lindberg followed Sorenson’s requirements for a proper affidavit 
disclosure but did not consider Sorenson’s mitigating factor of good 
faith that could prevent outright dismissal in potentially 
meritorious cases. As the dissent noted, “This was not the ‘frivolous 
litigation’ that [section 145.682] was intended to remedy, rather it 
is one of those borderline cases where counsel retained a qualified 
expert and made a good faith effort to disclose meaningful 
information of what the expert testimony would be.”129 By ignoring 
the mitigating factor of good faith, Lindberg shifted the court’s 
jurisprudence away from a concern over meritorious lawsuits and 
towards a narrow concern for frivolous lawsuits.130 
Less than a year after Lindberg, the court decided another 
medical malpractice case with the same narrow concern for 
frivolous lawsuits.131 The discussion below explores how this trend 
spilled over into non-medical malpractice case law. 
(citing Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d 188). 
 128.  Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 578 (emphasis added). 
 129.  Id. at 580 (Gilbert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 130.  This is perhaps best demonstrated by the last sentence of Justice 
Anderson’s concurring opinion in Lindberg, where he noted that “[this decision] is 
a harsh result, especially in light of the personal tragedy suffered by the Lindberg 
family, nevertheless, it is a result mandated by the law based on the record before 
us.” Id. at 579 (Anderson, J., concurring specially). 
 131.  See Anderson v. Rengachary, 608 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 2000). In Anderson, 
A doctor performed surgery that caused a woman to suffer nerve severing and 
swelling. Id. at 845. The plaintiff sued the doctor, and her lawyer timely filed both 
affidavits. Id. The doctor waited out the 180-day deadline and then moved to 
dismiss the lawsuit on the basis that the second affidavit was defective. Id. The 
district court granted this motion because the affidavit provided no causal 
connection between the doctor’s negligent act and the woman’s injury. Id. The 
court of appeals reversed the district court, finding that the woman filed the 
17
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3. The Most Recent Case Law on Sections 544.42 and 145.682:
Brown-Wilbert and Wesely
Brown-Wilbert arose out of a father-and-son-owned business.132 
The business used an accounting firm to help in an acquisition of 
another company, but the firm allegedly acted as the father’s 
personal accountant and contrary to the son’s interests.133 This 
allegedly resulted in numerous damages to the company;134 for 
example, the firm “allowed [the father] to misappropriate 
hundreds of thousands of dollars of [the company’s] money.”135 
The son first sued his father in a shareholder rights action, 
resulting in the son buying out all of the father’s company shares in 
a settlement.136 With the son controlling the company, the company 
sued for accounting malpractice.137 
Brown-Wilbert affirmed the dismissal of an action for accounting 
malpractice because the requirements for the second affidavit were 
unfulfilled.138 In a response to an interrogatory requesting the 
grounds for expert opinion, the plaintiff named two experts and 
answered that they were “expected to testify as to the conclusions 
set forth in the Complaint.”139 This response contained no new 
information besides the names of two experts.140 Similar to 
Sorenson’s interpretation that conclusory statements do not satisfy 
the second affidavit requirements under section 145.682,141 Brown-
 
affidavits in good faith and had no notice that the second affidavit was insufficient 
before the 180 days expired. Anderson v. Rengachary, 591 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1999), rev’d, 608 N.W.2d 843. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that “[n]o language in [section 145.682] suggests that a plaintiff is 
entitled to notice of the insufficiency of the affidavit prior to the expiration of the 
180 days,” and that the court of appeals “created a good-faith exception to the 
statute of uncertain proportions.” Anderson, 608 N.W.2d at 849. 
 132.  Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 212–13 
(Minn. 2007). 
 133.  Id. at 213. 
 134.  Id. 
135.  Complaint ¶ 54, Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., No. A05-
340 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005), 2005 WL 3111959. 
 136.  Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., No. A05-340, 2005 WL 
3111959, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 732 N.W.2d 
209 (Minn. 2007). 
 137.  See id. 
 138.  Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 219–20. 
 139.  Id. at 214. 
 140.  See id.  
141.  Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. 
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Wilbert held that the conclusory allegations made in the 
interrogatory answers did not meet the minimum standards under 
section 544.42.142 As interpreted by Brown-Wilbert, the minimum 
standards for a proper disclosure are that the second affidavit must 
contain (1) the expert’s identity and (2) the expert’s opinion 
supporting the elements of a prima facie malpractice case.143 The 
court applied this standard objectively to determine whether to 
grant the plaintiff sixty days of safe harbor or grant pretrial 
dismissal of the case.144 Although the plaintiff in Brown-Wilbert met 
the first requirement by identifying experts,145 there were only 
conclusory statements to support the opinion.146 Consequently, the 
court dismissed the action.147 
Sorenson and Lindberg both influenced the Brown-Wilbert 
decision. Brown-Wilbert explicitly stated that it was influenced by 
Sorenson’s discussion of “borderline cases”148 and adopted Sorenson’s 
opening for extra-statutory considerations by implementing 
minimum standards for the second affidavit.149 However, one 
notable difference between the cases is that Brown-Wilbert’s 
standards are strictly objective,150 while Sorenson considers the 
plaintiff’s good faith balanced against the prejudice the defendant 
may sustain from allowing an affidavit remedy.151 Because Brown-
1990) (citing MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 2(2) (2014)). 
 142.  See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d. at 219. 
 143.  Id. These standards are considered objectively; subjective intent to submit 
an affidavit in good faith is irrelevant. Id. at 216. But see House v. Kelbel, 105 F. 
Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (stating that courts can take alternative action to dismissal 
when an affidavit is “submitted in good faith”). 
 144.  Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 218–19. 
 145.  Id. at 214. 
 146.  Id. at 219. 
 147.  Id. at 219–20. 
 148.  Id. at 219. 
 149.  See id.; see also House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (D. Minn. 
2000) (noting that Sorenson “left an opening in which the court can take an 
alternative action to mandatory dismissal and allow a case to proceed on the 
merits”); Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn. 
1990). 
 150.  Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 216 (holding that the statutory 
requirements are objective). 
 151.  House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (“In dicta, the Sorenson Court 
acknowledged that mandatory dismissal of a suit in which a party provides a 
substantively deficient affidavit in good faith might be a harsh result.”). 
Specifically, Sorenson suggested that dismissal may not be appropriate if the 
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Wilbert rejected a good faith standard and set its own objective 
standards,152 the case marks a significant difference with Sorenson. 
Brown-Wilbert also makes no mention of Sorenson’s discussion of 
lesser sanctions than outright dismissal, such as allowing the 
defendant to depose the plaintiff’s expert at the plaintiff’s 
expense.153 This was likely omitted because Brown-Wilbert followed 
Lindberg’s lead in following the legislature’s original intent of the 
statute to dismiss frivolous cases.154 Towards this end, Brown-Wilbert 
connected its decision to dismiss the case to the legislature’s intent 
to eliminate frivolous cases: 
[I]f we look to the purpose for section 544.42, to provide 
a mechanism for the early dismissal of frivolous actions, 
the minimum standards for such an affidavit should be 
that it contains meaningful information on each of the 
issues for which expert testimony will be required at trial 
to avoid a directed verdict.155 
By way of contrast, in the first medical malpractice case 
interpreting section 145.682’s safe harbor provision, the Wesely v. 
Flor court declined to extend Brown-Wilbert and took an entirely new 
approach to interpreting the statute.156 Looking at the safe harbor 
provision’s plain language, the Wesely court determined that any 
timely affidavit would automatically be granted forty-five days of 
safe harbor upon a motion to dismiss.157 The Wesely court reasoned 
that, on a plain reading of the statute, the court plays no role in 
determining the adequacy of the second affidavit before safe 
harbor is exhausted.158 
After Wesely, a question remained as to whether the 
discrepancy between Wesely and Brown-Wilbert is justified. Wesely 
maintained that its holding did not overrule Brown-Wilbert because 
the court identifies the deficiencies in the affidavit under section 
544.42; under section 145.682, the defendant identifies the 
plaintiff provides some “meaningful disclosure” and the defendant is not severely 
prejudiced by the defective affidavit. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193. 
 152.  Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 216–18. 
 153.  See Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193. 
 154.  See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 217. 
 155.  Id. at 218 (emphasis added). 
 156.  See 806 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 2011). 
 157.  Id. (“[Section 145.682] does not limit the safe-harbor period to only 
certain types of deficiencies.”). 
 158.  Id. at 42–43. 
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deficiencies.159 Thus, under Wesely, the court plays a role in section 
544.42 in a way that it does not in section 145.682.160 However, 
despite section 544.42’s reference to the court’s role in identifying 
deficiencies, it is not entirely clear how section 544.42 allows the 
court to deny safe harbor strictly because of a defective affidavit.161 
Amidst this background, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
decided Guzick v. Kimball. Because Guzick was a legal malpractice 
case, section 544.42 controlled. Consequently, it was likely that 
Guzick would follow Brown-Wilbert’s interpretation of section 544.42. 
But Guzick presented a new challenge: it was the supreme court’s 
first legal malpractice case interpreting section 544.42; as such, it 
was unclear what elements of legal malpractice required expert 
support. Moreover, although Wesely was not controlling, it was 
lurking in the background with a radically different holding on a 
virtually identical statute. It remained to be seen whether the court 
would take steps to address this discrepancy. 
III. THE GUZICK DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Colleen Bennett (“Bennett”) was the legal assistant of attorney 
Larry Kimball (“Kimball”) at Kimball Law Office.162 In 2008, Louis 
Nyberg, Jr. (“Tony”) asked Bennett to draft a power of attorney 
form that would allow Tony to act as attorney-in-fact on behalf of 
his uncle, George Nyberg (“George”).163 
Per office procedure, Bennett printed a standard form and 
filled in George’s information.164 The form contained a pre-
checked box that would allow Tony full access to all of George’s 
property.165 Bennett gave the form to Tony, who obtained George’s 
signature.166 However, neither Bennett nor Kimball, as Bennett’s 
 159.  Id. at 41–42. 
 160.  See id. 
161.  This was central to the dissent in Brown-Wilbert, which argued that the 
case should have been allowed to proceed on the basis of good faith. Brown-
Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 228 (Minn. 2007) 
(Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
162.  Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 2015). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
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supervisor, determined whether George read and understood the 
form.167 In fact, Kimball did not even see the form.168 
In early 2009, Tony used the power of attorney form at a Wells 
Fargo branch to add his name to two of George’s bank accounts as 
a joint owner with a right of survivorship.169 A few days later, George 
died.170 Around this time—before and after George’s death—Tony 
transferred $226,524 to bank accounts he shared with his wife.171 
Representing George’s estate, Timothy Guzick sued Kimball 
for legal malpractice and alleged that Kimball had a duty to 
supervise Bennett and also had an independent duty to meet with 
George to discuss the legal consequences of the power of 
attorney.172 Kimball moved for summary judgment against Guzick’s 
claims on the basis that Guzick did not provide a satisfactory 
affidavit of expert disclosure within the required 180-day 
timeframe.173 Although Guzick referenced the affidavit of expert 
review in answering Kimball’s interrogatories, Kimball argued that 
this was inadequate because the expert’s opinion was conclusory 
and did not establish any of the four elements of legal 
malpractice.174 
The district court agreed with Kimball and granted the motion 
for summary judgment.175 It held that Guzick’s answers to Kimball’s 
interrogatories were “grossly deficient in meeting the statutory 
requirements.”176 The court also held that all four elements of legal 
malpractice should have been supported by expert opinion and 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. at 44–45. Before suing Kimball, Guzick sued Tony and Tony’s wife for 
conversion. Id. at 44. They filed for bankruptcy, and Guzick won a sum in 
bankruptcy court. Id. Guzick also sued Wells Fargo. Id. Wells Fargo settled the 
case. Brief of Appellants Larry Alan Kimball, Kimball Law Off., and Kimball and 
Undem, Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42 (2015) (No. A14-0429), 2015 WL 
1070344, at *4. One of Kimball’s defenses was that these previous lawsuits showed 
the damages were the result of third parties, and therefore, Kimball could not be 
liable. Id. at *8. 
 173.  Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 45; see also MINN. STAT. § 544.42 (2016). 
 174.  Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 45–46. 
175.  Guzick v. Kimball, No. 11-CV-13-689, 2014 WL 9963420, at *2 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Jan. 3, 2014), rev’d, No. A14-0429, 2014 WL 4957973 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 
6, 2014), rev’d, 869 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2015). 
 176.  Id. at *2. 
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that Guzick supported none of them.177 In finding that all four 
elements required expert support, the court noted that a lay juror 
could not understand how the facts of the case establish any 
element of legal malpractice.178 
Guzick appealed the decision, and the court of appeals 
reversed.179 The court first noted that expert support is generally 
not required to prove the first element of legal malpractice, the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship.180 Next, the court stated 
that the remaining three elements—a negligent act, but-for cause, 
and proximate cause—generally require expert testimony and that 
only “exceptional” or “rare” cases will not require expert testimony 
for these elements.181 However, the court held that this case 
presented an exception for establishing a but-for cause.182 This is 
because “lay-witness testimony” could establish pertinent questions 
relating to cause-in-fact issues, such as whether Wells Fargo or Tony 
was the but-for cause of George’s damages.183 Consequently, the 
court held that expert opinion was only required to fulfill two 
elements of legal malpractice: a negligent act and proximate 
causation.184 Finally, the court held that Guzick’s affidavit was 
sufficient to satisfy these two elements.185 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
Kimball appealed the court of appeals’ decision, and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed on the basis that Guzick’s 
second affidavit was conclusory and failed the Brown-Wilbert 
standards.186 First, the court noted that Guzick procedurally met the 
180-day limit on the second affidavit by answering Kimball’s 
interrogatories.187 As such, Guzick potentially qualified for statutory 
safe harbor, which would have required the court to give him 
 177.  Id. at *3. 
 178.  Id.  
 179.  Guzick, 2014 WL 4957973, at *1. 
 180.  Id. at *3. 
 181.  Id. (citing Fontaine v. Steen, 759 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2009)). 
 182.  Id. at *5. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at *6. 
 185.  Id. at *11. 
186.  Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 51–52 (Minn. 2015).  
 187.  Id. at 48. 
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notice of deficiencies in the affidavit and sixty days to remedy those 
deficiencies.188 As a result, Brown-Wilbert applied, and the court 
considered whether Guzick satisfied the minimum standards.189 
Guzick plainly satisfied the first Brown-Wilbert element: disclosure of 
the expert to be called upon.190 Consequently, the case hinged on 
the outcome of a two-step process: The court had to determine (1) 
which elements of legal malpractice required expert opinion, and 
(2) whether Guzick’s affidavit was satisfactory for each of these 
elements under Brown-Wilbert.191 
Generally, the court noted that it considers each element of 
malpractice on a “case-by-case” basis.192 First, expert opinion is 
generally always required to establish a negligent act.193 Since this 
case presented no exception, the court required expert opinion on 
this element.194 However, because the parties did not dispute that 
the affidavit established a negligent act,195 this was not part of the 
court’s analysis. 
The court held that the other three elements of legal 
malpractice—but-for cause, proximate cause, and the existence of 
an attorney-client relationship—do not generally require expert 
support.196 This holding directly rejected the court of appeals’ 
position that both causation elements typically require expert 
support as a general rule.197 The court reasoned that the court of 
appeals unjustifiably relied on medical malpractice case law to 
derive its rule.198 Rather than provide a general rule with a lay juror 
exception, the court asked whether the facts relating to an element 
are “within an area of common knowledge and lay comprehension 
 188.  MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (2016). 
 189.  Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 48. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See id. at 49–50 (stating the main issue as whether or not the affidavit was 
satisfactory for the elements requiring expert opinion). 
 192.  Id. at 48–49. 
 193.  Id. at 49. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  See id. at 49–50 (noting that the parties dispute whether the “expert 
disclosure . . . satisfied Brown-Wilbert’s standard for but-for causation, proximate 
causation, and the existence of an attorney-client relationship”). 
 196.  See id. at 50 (quoting Tousignant v. St. Louis Cty., 615 N.W.2d 53, 58 
(Minn. 2000)) (“Although legal malpractice claims may involve complex causation 
issues, ‘complex issues of science or technology’ are generally not found in legal 
malpractice cases.”). 
 197.  Id. (citing Tousignant, 615 N.W.2d at 58). 
 198.  Id. (citing Tousignant, 615 N.W.2d at 58). 
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such that they can be adequately evaluated by a jury in the absence 
of an expert.”199 
Applying this method, the court found that an expert was not 
required to establish but-for cause.200  The court reasoned that a lay 
juror could make causal inferences about whether Kimball’s 
negligent acts were a but-for cause of the overbroad power of 
attorney form and whether this form was a but-for cause of the 
vulnerability of George’s funds.201 Consequently, the court did not 
consider the second step of the process: whether but-for cause was 
satisfactory under Brown-Wilbert. 
Next, the court considered proximate cause, and this is what 
decided the case. Notably, Guzick did not dispute that expert 
certification was required for proximate cause, which is perhaps the 
only reason the court required it.202 Since expert support was 
required for proximate cause, Brown-Wilbert applied, and the court 
ruled that Guzick’s second affidavit was plainly conclusory because 
it only stated that Kimball’s negligent acts “caused damages.”203 
Consequently, this defect in the affidavit precluded Guzick from 
safe harbor under Brown-Wilbert.204 
Finally, because the affidavit was already deemed defective, the 
court considered it unnecessary to discuss the requirements for an 
attorney-client relationship.205 Thus, the court only required an 
expert to establish a negligent act and proximate cause.206 
IV. ANALYSIS
This section begins by placing Guzick in the historical context 
discussed in Part II. When deciding whether to grant safe harbor 
for a defective affidavit, Guzick followed Brown-Wilbert’s minimum 
 199.  Id. (citing Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 337, 252 N.W.2d 107, 
116 (1977)). 
 200.  Id. at 50–51. 
 201.  Id. at 50. 
 202.  Id. Justice Lillehaug noted in his concurring opinion that if Guzick had 
not agreed that an expert was required for proximate cause, “it would have been a 
close call as to whether an expert was necessary to establish proximate cause under 
the facts of this case.” Id. at 52 (Lillehaug, J., concurring).  
 203.  Id. at 51 (majority opinion) (noting that Guzick should not be allowed 
safe harbor because he had been pursuing other lawsuits, which were based on the 
same facts, for multiple years). 
 204.  Id. at 51–52; see also MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (2016). 
 205.  Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 48 n.5.  
 206.  Id. at 48. 
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standards and did not consider the plaintiff’s good faith.207 The 
discussion in this section explores how this approach runs counter 
to the legislature’s intent to avoid dismissing meritorious cases. To 
demonstrate how Brown-Wilbert can dismiss meritorious cases, this 
section traces the procedural history of Wesely through the district 
court and the court of appeals. 
The analysis then shifts to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wesely, which reversed the court of appeals and declined 
to extend Brown-Wilbert to medical malpractice.208 This created 
tension between Wesely and Brown-Wilbert because the cases’ 
underlying statutes—sections 145.682 and 544.42, respectively—
have only minor differences.209 None of these differences, however, 
lend support to the Brown-Wilbert standards.210 Consequently, 
Wesley’s approach, which follows the plain language of the statute, 
makes more sense.211 
Finally, this section ends with a discussion on how the Brown-
Wilbert standards will not provide fair warning to plaintiffs before 
their claims are dismissed. This is not only unfair, but it may also 
have a detrimental impact on the public’s perception of the legal 
profession. 
A. Guzick’s Historical Foundation Runs Against Legislative Intent 
Guzick followed the Brown-Wilbert minimum standards for the 
second expert affidavit in non-medical malpractice actions.212 In 
establishing these standards, Brown-Wilbert claimed to be influenced 
by Sorenson’s discussion of “borderline cases.”213 In the medical 
malpractice context, Sorenson attempted to ease the crudeness of an 
“all or nothing” application of section 145.682 in potentially 
meritorious cases.214 Plaintiffs could avoid dismissal if affidavits were 
filed in good faith and as long as they did not prejudice the 
207.  Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 216 (Minn. 
2007). 
208.  Wesely v. Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Minn. 2011). 
 209.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 145.682, with id. § 544.42. 
 210.  See Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53 (Lillehaug, J., concurring). 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. at 47 (majority opinion). 
213.  Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 219 (Minn. 
2007). 
 214.  See Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr. 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn. 
1990). 
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defendant.215 In such cases, Sorenson offered a middle ground and 
suggested lesser sanctions for plaintiffs than outright dismissal.216 
Sorenson, therefore, made an opening for the court to go beyond 
the statute in borderline cases.217 
Brown-Wilbert adopted Sorenson’s opening for extra-statutory 
considerations, but then it rejected Sorenson’s good faith standard 
and set its own objective “minimum standards.”218 This is 
problematic for two reasons. First, by invoking Sorenson, Brown-
Wilbert takes us back to Sorenson’s time, before there was a safe 
harbor provision.219 Sorenson’s application is therefore questionable 
because section 145.682 is more favorable to plaintiffs after the 
addition of safe harbor, and section 544.42 has always had safe 
harbor.220 Second, Brown-Wilbert actually adds an additional burden 
for plaintiffs by switching out good faith for detailed objective 
standards.221 Consequently, it is probable that Brown-Wilbert’s 
standards, which burden plaintiffs despite section 544.42’s safe 
harbor provision, are even harsher than Sorenson’s approach, which 
the court used before safe harbor even existed for section 
145.682.222 Thus, the Brown-Wilbert standards arguably run against 
 215.  House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1052 (D. Minn. 2000) (citing 
Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193). 
 216.  Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193. 
 217.  House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. 
 218.  Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 216–18. 
 219.  See Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 54 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J., 
concurring). 
 220.  See id. (citing Act of May 22, 2002, ch. 403, § 1, 2002 Minn. Laws 1706, 
1706–07) (noting that there is “no real value” to citing medical malpractice cases 
that were decided before safe harbor was even enacted).  
 221.  See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 227 (Anderson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting that Brown-Wilbert’s approach is much narrower 
than Sorenson’s standard and that Brown-Wilbert causes “great potential for 
unfairness and unduly harsh results”). 
 222.  See id. Also consider the fact that Guzick’s affidavit was dismissed despite 
containing ten specific departures from the standard of care. Respondent’s Brief, 
Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42 (No. A14-0429), 2015 WL 1070341, at *29. For 
example, Mr. Kimball “failed to supervise [his legal assistant] . . . in the drafting of 
the [Power of Attorney form]” and “failed to meet and talk with George Nyberg” 
to assess his legal competency and why he wanted an attorney-in-fact. Id. at *27. 
This is arguably more detailed than the affidavit in Sorenson, where it vaguely noted 
that a fetal anomaly “should have been apparent” to the doctor on duty and that 
the doctor on duty “failed to properly diagnose” fetal distress and “failed to take 
proper steps” to deliver the baby. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr. 457 
N.W.2d 188, 192 (Minn. 1990). The affidavits in Sorenson and Guzick were both 
27
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the legislature’s intent for safe harbor to prevent dismissals of 
meritorious cases.223 As the next section explores, this potential for 
dismissing meritorious cases is very real. 
B. Brown-Wilbert and Guzick Might Lead to Unjust Outcomes and 
Dispose of Meritorious Lawsuits 
The facts and procedural history of Wesely v. Flor224 provide a 
good example of how Guzick and Brown-Wilbert might dismiss 
meritorious cases. While Ms. Wesely was receiving dental care, the 
power went out and her dentist became distracted.225 Consequently, 
the dentist’s drill damaged Ms. Wesely’s teeth and lip.226 The dentist 
then tried to repair the damage.227 While doing so, the dentist 
allegedly rested his hand on her jaw and forced her jaw into various 
abnormal directions.228 The pressure allegedly displaced her jaw 
and caused disfigurement.229 Consequently, Ms. Wesely sued the 
dentist and the dental office.230 
To make matters worse for Ms. Wesely, her attorney withdrew 
from the case eighty-three days before the 180-day deadline for 
submitting a second affidavit.231 The attorney had Ms. Wesely’s 
medical records, and Ms. Wesely did not receive the records until 
twenty days before the expiration of the 180-day deadline.232 With 
no attorney, Ms. Wesely acted pro se, finding an expert and serving 
the second affidavit eleven days before the deadline.233 Ms. Wesely 
met with a new attorney two days after the 180-day deadline passed, 
and the new attorney told her the expert supporting the submitted 
deemed insufficient. Guzick, 2015 WL 1070341, at *29; Sorenson, 457 
N.W.2d at 193. However, Guzick’s affidavit was arguably much more detailed.  
 223.  For example, the point of adding a safe harbor provision to section 
145.682 was to ease a civil procedure that was “too strict.” MINN. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 58. 
224.  Wesely v. Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2011). 
 225.  Id. at 38. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Id. 
231. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 1, Wesely v. Flor, 791 N.W.2d 583 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (No. A10–478), 2010 WL 5493722. 
 232.  Wesely v. Flor, 791 N.W.2d 583, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 806 
N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2011). 
 233.  See id. at 585. 
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affidavit might not be suitable because he was not a dentist.234 
Shortly after this, the defendant moved to dismiss the lawsuit over a 
deficient affidavit.235 Within forty-five days of this motion, Ms. 
Wesely, now represented by the new lawyer, served a new affidavit 
with a new expert.236 
In the district court, Ms. Wesely argued that her first lawyer’s 
withdrawal and the subsequent delay in receiving her medical 
records should provide her with an extension on the basis of 
excusable neglect.237 She also argued that she “did her best,” 
implying that her good-faith effort, combined with the pressing 
circumstances, should grant her an extension.238 
The district court rejected Ms. Wesely’s arguments. The court 
noted that the expert’s identity is the most important part of the 
affidavit,239 and because the new affidavit had a new expert, it could 
not amend the previous affidavit.240 On this basis, the court 
dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.241 
In its decision, the district court acknowledged the merit of 
Ms. Wesely’s case.242 The district court specifically stated that 
“despite a deficient expert affidavit, it appears that the Plaintiff has 
a reasonable suit on the merits.”243 The court also stated it was 
“sympathetic to [Ms. Wesely], but that does not allow the court to 
bend what is a strict and clear time limit under the statute.”244 
The district court’s argument runs against legislative intent. If 
Ms. Wesely’s case was “app[arently] . . . reasonable . . . on the 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  See id. The new expert pointed to the dentist’s negligent failure to refer 
Ms. Wesely to “immediate medical care” after displacing her jaw. Appellant’s Brief 
and Appendix at 8, Wesely v. Flor, 791 N.W.2d 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (No. 
A10-478), 2010 WL 5493722. The new expert also stated that there “is limited 
expectation that treatment will ever restore [Ms. Wesely’s] jaw to its pre-trauma 
condition” and noted Ms. Wesely’s “constant, consistent and persistent pain.” Id. 
 237.  See Wesely v. Flor, No. 24-CV-09-1592, 2010 WL 5577258, at *9 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010), aff’d, 791 N.W.2d 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 806 
N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2011). 
 238.  See id. 
 239.  Id. at *10. 
 240.  Id. at *7 (“[The statute] does not state that a new affidavit by a new 
expert is an acceptable method of curing the deficiencies.”). 
 241.  Id. at *10. 
 242.  Id. at *9. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. at *7. 
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merits,”245 her case could not have been frivolous.246 And because 
her case was not frivolous, allowing it to proceed would have 
aligned with the legislature’s intent to stop frivolous cases.247 
Moreover, the 2002 safe harbor provision was enacted to prevent 
meritorious cases from being dismissed.248 Here, the court admitted 
the lawsuit was probably meritorious but still dismissed the case.249 
This interpretation of section 145.682 is not what the legislature 
intended. 
The situation did not improve in the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals. In Wesely, the court of appeals not only upheld the district 
court’s decision, it found further support for the district court’s 
conclusion in Brown-Wilbert: 
[Ms. Wesely] also argues that she made a good-faith effort 
to comply with [section 145.682]. But the Brown-Wilbert 
court declined to adopt a good-faith standard for 
complying with [section 544.42, subdivision 4], because it 
would inject a subjective element into the requirements 
for an affidavit of expert [disclosure]. The district court 
did not abuse its discretion in declining to extend the 180-
day period to allow appellant to submit an expert-
disclosure affidavit.250 
 245.  Id. at *9. 
 246.  Frivolous Claim, BLACK’S, supra note 1 (defining a frivolous claim as “[a] 
claim that has no legal basis or merit, esp[ecially] one brought for an 
unreasonable purpose such as harassment” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b))). 
 247.  See Clark et al., supra note 42. 
 248.  See MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 58; see also Brown-
Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 217 (Minn. 2007) (citing S. 
Deb. on S.F. 0936, 82d Minn. Leg. (May 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Neuville)). 
 249.  See Wesely, 2010 WL 5577258, at *10–11. 
 250.  Wesely, 791 N.W.2d at 589 (citation omitted). Readers should note that 
the language in this quote was altered by the author to correct two small errors in 
the court’s opinion. The court’s opinion incorrectly states that Brown-Wilbert 
“declined to adopt a good-faith standard for complying with [section] 544.42, 
subd[ivision] 3, because it would inject a subjective element into the requirements 
for an affidavit of expert review.” Id. (emphasis added). The Brown-Wilbert court 
made it clear that it declined to adopt good faith for the affidavit of expert 
disclosure, which is in subdivision 4 of section 544.42, not subdivision 3. The Brown-
Wilbert opinion reads: “We decline to adopt a ‘good faith’ standard because it 
would inject a subjective element into the requirements for an affidavit of expert 
disclosure. . . . [W]e read section 544.42, subdivision 4, to describe objective 
requirements for an affidavit of expert disclosure . . . .” Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 
216 (emphasis added). 
30
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/7
 
2017] GUZICK V. KIMBALL 295 
By referencing the Minnesota Supreme Court decision of Brown-
Wilbert, the court of appeals authoritatively disposed of Ms. Wesely’s 
good-faith intentions251 and arguably disposed a meritorious lawsuit 
as a result.252 The court isolated the issue to the affidavit defects 
alone. Notably, the court did not consider Ms. Wesely’s lawyer who 
withdrew from representation,253 her receipt of the medical records 
twenty days before the 180-day deadline,254 her pro se attempt to 
timely file the affidavit after being unable to find a new attorney,255 
and her retention of a new attorney as soon as she could find 
one.256 To proceed with her claim under the pressing 
circumstances, Ms. Wesely had to act pro se and file the affidavit 
herself despite allegedly suffering “constant, consistent and 
persistent pain.”257 These facts minimally establish Ms. Wesely’s 
good faith effort to appropriately file the second affidavit. Brown-
Wilbert’s minimum standards do not account for this effort. As a 
result, if the story ended here, Brown-Wilbert’s influence would have 
provided extra credibility and authority to dispose of what was 
arguably a meritorious lawsuit. 
C. Guzick Should Have Rejected Brown-Wilbert and Followed the Plain 
Statutory Language of Section 544.42 
Ms. Wesely’s story did not end at the court of appeals. In 2011, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to extend Brown-Wilbert to 
medical malpractice in Wesely v. Flor.258 The court reasoned that, 
under the plain language of section 145.682, the triggering of the 
forty-five day safe harbor period is entirely procedural and 
automatic.259 Thus, there is no place for a substantive Brown-Wilbert 
analysis of an affidavit’s content.260 In contrast, under section 
 251.  See Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178 (1940) (citing Beals v. 
Hale, 45 U.S. 37, 54 (1846)) (“The highest state court is the final authority on 
state law.”); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 252.  Wesely, 2010 WL 5577258, at *9 (noting that the lawsuit was “app[arently] 
. . . meritorious”). 
 253.  Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, Wesely v. Flor, 791 N.W.2d 583 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2010) (No. A10-0478), 2010 WL 5493722, at *1. 
 254.  Wesely, 791 N.W.2d at 589. 
 255.  Id. at 585. 
 256.  Id.  
257.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 253, at *8. 
258.  806 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Minn. 2011). 
 259.  Id. at 41. 
 260.  Id. at 42.  
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544.42, the court triggers the safe harbor period and issues specific 
deficiencies in the affidavit.261 Therefore, Wesely reasoned that 
Brown-Wilbert fits into the statutory framework of section 544.42.262 
Wesely is persuasive regarding the differences in the statutes. 
Under section 544.42, the court identifies the deficiencies and 
initiates the plaintiff’s sixty days of safe harbor.263 Under section 
145.682, the defendant identifies the deficiencies and the plaintiff 
has at least forty-five days to remedy the affidavit upon service of 
the motion.264 In sum, the court is involved in the safe-harbor 
process in section 544.42, but all references to the court are absent 
from the plain statutory language of section 145.682.265 
However, under the rules of statutory interpretation, the 
differences in the two statutes are not enough for Guzick to uphold 
Brown-Wilbert.266 The first step in statutory interpretation is to 
determine whether the statute’s words are clear and 
unambiguous.267 If the statute is unambiguous, the court applies 
the plain meaning of the statute.268 Section 544.42 is clear and 
unambiguous—it does not state that the court plays a substantive 
role in granting safe harbor.269 Rather, subdivision 6(c) states that 
“an initial motion to dismiss an action . . . shall not be granted, unless 
after notice by the court, the nonmoving party is given 60 days to satisfy the 
disclosure requirements in subdivision 4.”270 This plain language 
suggests that the court’s role is limited to providing notice that the 
sixty days have started.271 In other words, the court does not grant 
 261.  Id.  
 262.  See id. 
 263.  MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (2016). 
 264.  Id. § 145.682, subdiv. 6(c)(2). 
 265.  See Wesely, 806 N.W.2d at 41. 
 266.  See Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 53 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J., 
concurring). 
 267.  Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012); see MINN. 
STAT. § 645.16 (“When the words of a law in their application to an existing 
situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be 
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”). 
 268.  Staab, 813 N.W.2d at 73.  
 269.  See Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53; see also MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c). 
 270.  MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (emphasis added); see also Guzick, 869 
N.W.2d at 53 (citing MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c)). 
 271.  Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53. In Guzick’s only concurring opinion, Justice 
Lillehaug noted that Brown-Wilbert invented the court’s authority to substantively 
decide an affidavit’s merits before granting sixty days of safe harbor. Id. at 53–54. 
Provided that the language of section 544.42 unambiguously provides sixty days of 
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safe harbor at the time of notice; the court only notifies the plaintiff 
that the clock has started ticking, and the court cannot dismiss the 
case until the clock stops.272 And, while the court must identify 
deficiencies in the affidavit, the plaintiff has sixty days to remedy 
the deficiencies.273 
Brown-Wilbert reasoned its interpretation of the statute was 
necessary because allowing affidavits with little or no content 
“would render the 180-day requirement meaningless.”274 After all, a 
plaintiff could submit a “placeholder” affidavit to delay submitting 
a proper affidavit.275 However, Wesely convincingly explained that 
this is unlikely because the first affidavit requires that the plaintiff 
already “[be] in contact with an expert.”276 Therefore, the plaintiff 
would usually have little reason to use such a tactic.277 Moreover, 
even if a plaintiff uses this tactic, it is risky because it only leaves 
sixty days to submit an affidavit, and a failure to submit an affidavit 
in good faith could shift the defendant’s attorney fees and other 
costs to the plaintiff.278 Finally, even if some “placeholder” affidavits 
arise, this does not render the 180-day requirement meaningless. 
safe harbor before a motion can be dismissed, this “judicial concoction” is 
unwarranted. Id. Thus, while he reluctantly concurred with the majority’s 
application of Brown-Wilbert, Justice Lillehaug argued that the court should 
eventually return to the plain language of the statute. Id. at 55–56. 
 272.  See id. at 53. 
 273.  MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c); Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53. 
274.  Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 217–18 
(Minn. 2007). The general rule is that, if at all possible, parts of a statute should 
not be rendered meaningless. State v. Wilson, 830 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. 2013) 
(citing State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 74 (Minn. 1996), as amended on reh’g (Oct. 
31, 1996)) (“In [applying the plain meaning of the statute], we interpret the 
statute in a manner that renders no part of it meaningless.”); see also MINN. STAT. 
§ 645.16 (“Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
provisions.”). 
 275.  Wesely v. Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Minn. 2011). Brown-Wilbert does not 
explicitly express the worry that a plaintiff might submit a “placeholder” affidavit, 
but it is implied. See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 217–18. 
 276.  Wesely, 806 N.W.2d at 42. 
277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. Subdivision 7 of sections 145.682 and 544.42 contain essentially the 
same language, and both allow sanctions if the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney 
does not certify the “affidavit or answers to interrogatories” in good faith. Compare 
MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 7, with id. § 145.682, subdiv. 7. The fact that 
subdivision 7 includes answers to interrogatories, which can only serve as the 
second affidavit under subdivision 4, suggests that the good faith standard for 
sanctions applies to both affidavits. See Wesely, 806 N.W.2d at 42. 
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Under the plain language of section 544.42, plaintiffs still must file 
an affidavit to access the sixty days of safe harbor.279 Without an 
affidavit at all, there is no safe harbor.280 Although the need for any 
affidavit at all sets a low bar, it is not a meaningless bar.281 
Consequently, the court must apply the plain language of the 
statute. 
Finally, even if there is something ambiguous about the safe 
harbor provision, this ambiguity can be resolved by considering the 
legislative intent of section 544.42. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee, which heard the bill that created section 544.42, 
intended the safe harbor provision to be available for all types of 
affidavit defects.282 Nothing in the bill hearing indicates that the 
safe harbor provision is only available for affidavits that can pass a 
test resembling the Brown-Wilbert standards. 
Without statutory support, historical support, or a reason to 
engage in statutory interpretation, there is no reason for Brown-
Wilbert’s minimum standards to exist. This leaves a plain reading of 
 279.  The statute’s plain language states that when providing notice, “the court 
shall issue specific findings as to the deficiencies of the affidavit . . . .” MINN. STAT. 
§ 544.42, subdiv. 6(c). This indicates that a filed affidavit must exist for a plaintiff
to potentially access safe harbor. House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (D. 
Minn. 2000).  
 280.  House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
 281.  Indeed, this is Wesely’s interpretation of section 145.682. Moreover, at 
least one other state also agrees the low bar of “any affidavit at all” is not a 
meaningless standard; Georgia’s analogous statute, which covers both medical and 
non-medical malpractice, has “‘no express limitation on the nature of the alleged 
defect subject to remedy.’” Gala v. Fisher, 770 S.E.2d 879, 883 (Ga. 2015) (quoting 
Porquez v. Washington, 492 S.E.2d 665, 668 n.3 (Ga. 1997) (citing GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 9-11-9.1)).
 282.  A bill summary that was provided to members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee noted that “[f]ailure to comply with [section 544.42’s requirements] 
would result, upon motion, in mandatory dismissal with prejudice, except that in 
an initial motion to dismiss . . . based on a deficient response, the party must be given 60 
days to satisfy the disclosure requirements.” KATHLEEN PONTIUS, S. COUNSEL & RESEARCH, 
SUMMARY OF S.F. NO. 627 (Minn. Mar. 25, 1997) (emphasis added) (on file with 
Mitchell Hamline Law Review). This summary is as clear as it can be: sixty days are 
available to remedy a deficient response in an initial motion to dismiss. See id. 
There is no limitation for major defects. Moreover, when the Judiciary Committee 
heard the bill, Senator Cohen noted that “if there is some type of defect, minor or 
otherwise, . . . the other party gets the opportunity to provide that correction.” Id. 
He argued that this opportunity should be extended to medical professionals 
under section 145.682. Id. All of this indicates that the legislature intended for safe 
harbor to be available for all affidavit defects.  
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the statute, which grants safe harbor to all plaintiffs that timely 
submit any affidavit.283 Wesely acknowledges this plain reading by 
granting safe harbor to all plaintiffs who timely submit any 
affidavit—likely even those who do not file in good faith (but those 
who fail to file in good faith are subject to sanctions).284 Wesely lets 
safe harbor do its job, and the court’s non-medical malpractice case 
law should, too. Guzick missed an opportunity to return the court to 
the plain statutory language of section 544.42. 
A legitimate question may arise at this point: why have separate 
statutes for medical and non-medical malpractice if the statutes are 
essentially the same? Besides the fact that section 145.682 grants 
forty-five days of safe harbor and section 544.42 grants sixty days, 
there is little separating the two statutes. One attractive solution to 
this problem is to simply eliminate section 145.682 and place all 
professionals, including medical professionals, under section 
544.42.285 As potential models, Georgia286 and Arizona287 have 
analogous statutes covering all professionals. 
D. Following the Statute’s Plain Language Will Provide Fair Warning to 
Plaintiffs and Improve Public Confidence in the Legal Profession 
Guzick noted that the court should determine whether but-for 
causation requires expert support by considering whether the facts 
relating to but-for causation fall within an area of common 
understanding for a lay juror.288 Presumably, the court would 
typically apply this standard to the legal malpractice elements of 
attorney-client relationship and proximate cause as well.289 
 283.  Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 53 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J., 
concurring). 
284.  Wesely v. Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Minn. 2011). 
 285.  Leo, supra note 56 at 1429 (“The legislature should abandon section 
145.682 and allow all malpractice claims, whether against doctors or other 
professionals, to be governed by statute section 544.42.”). 
 286.  GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Sess. of the Gen. 
Assemb.). 
 287.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. 
Sess. of the 52d Leg.). 
 288.  Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 50 (citing Hill v. Okay Const. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 
337, 252 N.W.2d 107, 116 (1977)). 
 289.  Guzick only indicates that expert testimony is generally required to 
establish a negligent act in a legal malpractice claim. Id. at 49. Guzick distinguishes 
this from the other elements of legal malpractice by stating that the court has 
“never required expert testimony on the other elements of a prima facie case of 
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When this inexact standard is combined with the power to 
dismiss a case with prejudice under Brown-Wilbert, its immediate 
application may unfairly dismiss the cases of unsuspecting 
plaintiffs.290 Brown-Wilbert and Guzick do not require the court to 
specify its expectations for expert opinion before deciding a 
motion to dismiss with prejudice. However, plaintiffs need to know 
the expectations of the presiding court and must have adequate 
notice to abide by these expectations.291 After all, what falls within 
the common understanding for a lay juror might change over time, 
and different courts might have different interpretations. Indeed, 
as the procedural history of Guzick demonstrates, the district court 
and the court of appeals disagreed about what elements of a prima 
facie legal malpractice case require expert testimony.292 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Guzick did nothing to 
clarify this confusion. In fact, Guzick arguably made the confusion 
worse because it rejected the rule that expert testimony is generally 
required for both causation elements of legal malpractice.293 
Without this general guideline, it is now more likely that courts will 
rely on the lay juror standard, leading to potentially more surprise 
dismissals. 
legal malpractice.” Id. Expert testimony is generally required to establish a 
negligent act in a legal malpractice claim in many jurisdictions outside Minnesota. 
See George L. Blum, Annotation, Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to 
Standards of Practice and Negligence in Malpractice Action Against Attorney—Conduct 
Related to Procedural Issues, 59 A.L.R. 6th 1, § 3 (2010). 
 290.  See Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 227 
(Minn. 2007) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[C]ourts 
are to consider and utilize less drastic alternatives than dismissal when a plaintiff 
has identified experts and given some meaningful disclosure of the expert’s 
testimony.”). 
 291.  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“[W]e insist that 
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know 
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the 
innocent by not providing fair warning.”). Notably, Arizona’s courts have 
recognized the need to provide adequate notice to plaintiffs; Arizona’s analogous 
statute on legal malpractice requires courts to give “fair notice to a plaintiff and an 
opportunity to cure . . . an expert deficiency.” Kaufman v. Jesser, 884 F. Supp. 2d 
943, 955 (D. Ariz. 2012); see also Warner v. Sw. Desert Images, LLC, 180 P.3d 986, 
994 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602, subd. E 
(1999)) (“Section 12-2602(E) provides that when a trial court determines an 
affidavit is required, it must ‘set a date and terms for compliance.’”).  
292.  See Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 45–46. 
 293.  Id. at 50 (citing Tousignant v. St. Louis Cty., 615 N.W.2d 53, 58 (Minn. 
2000)). 
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Beyond the problem of unfairness a lack of fair warning 
imposes, plaintiffs should have fair warning in malpractice cases to 
help instill public confidence in the legal profession. Often, a 
malpractice case is the only way a plaintiff can recover damages 
after her lawyer’s negligence cost her a meritorious claim.294 It is 
bad enough that a plaintiff lost one potentially meritorious claim 
and must sue her former lawyer for malpractice. But when the 
plaintiff’s new attorney in the malpractice suit fails a basic 
procedural requirement because of the unpredictable Brown-Wilbert 
standards, the plaintiff might lose a second meritorious claim.295 By 
this point, a plaintiff may have spent a small fortune and years of 
her life in litigation.296 Meanwhile, the plaintiff’s first attorney not 
only avoids paying for damages but also likely keeps the plaintiff’s 
fee. And the new attorney collects a fee from the plaintiff. It is not a 
stretch to think that the public might perceive this as lawyer 
profiteering at the expense of clients. 
The problem may be compared with the debate over whether 
lawyers must carry malpractice insurance. An attorney’s negligence 
may cost a plaintiff her claim, but if the attorney does not have 
malpractice insurance, legal malpractice attorneys typically avoid 
taking the case.297 On the plaintiff’s side, the end result is that she 
may lose two meritorious claims.298 As a result, one position is that 
 294.  This may present itself as a negligent failure to warn about a statute of 
limitations. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 695 
(Minn. 1980). 
 295.  As an example, a couple agreed to split their assets in a divorce 
agreement. Mazzocchi v. Goldstein Law Office, P.A., No. A09-2167, 2010 WL 
3463636, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2010). As part of the deal, the husband 
kept an investment and paid out half the estimated value of the investment to his 
wife, which was $33,600. Id. Less than a year later, however, the investment was 
worth $185,907. Id. The woman sued the attorneys for legal malpractice in their 
valuation of the investment. Id. However, her legal malpractice case was 
subsequently dismissed with prejudice because her new attorney did not properly 
state the former attorney’s standard of care under the Brown-Wilbert minimum 
standards in the second affidavit. Id. at *4. 
 296.  For example, in Mazzocchi, the woman obtained counsel in April 2004 for 
divorce proceedings. Id. at *1. The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed her 
legal malpractice claim with prejudice in September 2010—more than six years 
later. Id. at *5. 
 297.  Susan Saab Fortney, Law as a Profession: Examining the Role of Accountability, 
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 198 (2012) (citing Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice 
Insurance: The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1727 (1994)). 
 298.  Id. (citing Robert I. Johnston & Kathryn Lease Simpson, O Brothers, O 
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malpractice insurance is necessary to “maintain[] public 
confidence” in lawyers.299 The unpredictable Brown-Wilbert 
standards raise the exact same concerns. 
Public perception may improve if the lawyer escapes civil 
liability but is appropriately disciplined. The malpractice insurance 
problem and the Brown-Wilbert standards also present a similar 
problem for professional discipline: Minnesota attorneys must 
report whether they carry malpractice insurance annually, but they 
do not have to actually carry malpractice insurance.300 Professional 
responsibility boards and courts are unlikely to punish attorneys for 
not carrying malpractice insurance when insurance is not required 
and the professional rules are silent on insurance ideals.301 
Similarly, if a malpractice lawyer does her best with the 
unpredictable Brown-Wilbert standards and nevertheless fails, it is 
difficult to point to the rule of professional conduct she violated. 
Perhaps the lawyer escaping civil liability in the malpractice suit can 
be punished for unprofessional conduct,302 but depending on the 
rules the conduct violated, the punishment may be minimal. 
Because law is a self-regulated profession and it is nigh impossible 
to punish lawyers for something not in the professional rules, the 
public perception of Brown-Wilbert’s application may be that legal 
professionals are looking the other way for their friends and 
colleagues. 
Considering that the current case law might lead to unjust 
results and distrust in the legal profession, it makes sense to adopt 
the plain statutory language of section 544.42.303 If the plain 
Sisters, Art Thou Insured?, 24 PA. LAW. 28, 30 (2002)). 
 299.  Id. at 189 (quoting The Law Society, Professional Liability Insurance § 3.2 
(July 4, 2012), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/professional 
-indemnity-insurance). 
 300.  See MINN. R. OF THE SUP. CT. ON LAW. REGIS. 6 (2010), 
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/data/revisor/court_rules/pr/prsupr-6_2016  
-03-08_01-43-03/prsupr-6.pdf. 
 301.  For example, the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct are silent on 
insurance standards. See generally MINN. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT (2015). 
 302.  Notably, the lawyer does not have to be found civilly liable for the 
lawyer’s unprofessional actions to be punished professionally. See In re Disciplinary 
Action Against Shaughnessy, 467 N.W.2d 620, 621 (Minn. 1991) (noting that 
unprofessional actions “reflect adversely on the bar, and are destructive of public 
confidence in the legal profession”). 
 303.  See Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 53 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J., 
concurring).  
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statutory language applied, plaintiffs would have sixty days to 
remedy any defects.304 The plain language of section 544.42 is more 
forgiving and less likely to dismiss meritorious lawsuits.305 
V. CONCLUSION 
Guzick established a two-step process to determine the 
adequacy of expert affidavits supporting legal malpractice claims. 
First, on a case-by-case basis, courts determine which elements of 
legal malpractice require expert support.306 Second, of the 
elements that require support, courts evaluate their adequacy 
under the Brown-Wilbert minimum standards.307 Using this process, 
Guzick held that the plaintiff provided an inadequate expert 
affidavit and, as a result, dismissed the plaintiff’s case without 
granting any time to remedy the inadequacies.308 This is a harsh 
outcome that might lead to the dismissal of meritorious cases.309 
There is no justification for Guzick’s harsh outcome. Guzick’s 
pretrial evaluative process has no reason to exist when the 
legislature created an automatic one-step process—sixty days of safe 
harbor.310 Moreover, the court’s evaluative role in Guzick’s process 
makes its application unpredictable. In turn, this unpredictability 
might unfairly dismiss meritorious cases and even reduce the 
public’s trust in legal professionals. Consequently, the court should 
follow the lead of Wesely in the medical malpractice context and 
adopt the plain language of the underlying statute,311 which is more 
forgiving and less likely to preclude meritorious cases.312 
 304.  MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (2016). 
 305.  See Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53 (Lillehaug, J., concurring) (citing Wesely v. 
Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 2011)); see also Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland 
Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 228 (Minn. 2007) (Anderson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602, subd. E (1999)). 
 306.  Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 48–49. 
 307.  See id. at 51. 
 308.  Id.  
 309.  See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 228 (Anderson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 310.  Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53 (Lillehaug, J., concurring) (citing Wesely, 806 
N.W.2d at 41). 
 311.  Id.   
 312.  See id.; see also Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 228 (Anderson, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
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